Flying is dangerous.

Thousands of accidents occur each year, hundreds of which prove fatal. (AOPA, 2011) Every time we entrust our lives in a machine, we take a calculated risk. While we in this community may all agree that the rewards of flying far outweigh the associated risks, we must demonstrate a dedication to mitigating known potential risks by taking due precautions -- by being prudent. We do this not only for our own health, but also for the mental well-being of our loved ones and for the successful growth of the general aviation community as a whole. Besides, airplanes are expensive! Let's not try to destroy them, okay?

An article posted recently on AVweb.com exemplifies the type of gross departure from prudence that associates general aviation with risk. The article describes the recent events of Frank Fierro, an experienced Long Island, NY based pilot. On July 10, his "Challenger" ultralight aircraft experienced an in-flight engine failure, resulting in a forced landing onto the median of a busy Long Island highway (Sunrise Hwy). Fortunately, both Fierro and the aircraft were unharmed. But, this is the part that I don't understand. . .

Eight days later, Fierro, believing that the problem had been fixed, took to the sky again in his Challenger ultralight. This was the first flight of the Challenger since the July 10 incident. Eight minutes into the flight, his engine failed. Again, Fierro was forced to land the aircraft on the same highway. Twice, in two successive flights, Frank's life was in danger because the machine in which he trusted with his life had failed.

I sympathize with Frank for the first incident. Not knowing the aircraft's history or other factors that could have lead to the incident, I can only assume it was a chance occurrence, and I respect that his extensive training and skills as a pilot resulted in a safe conclusion to the event. The second incident, however, disturbs me, and is the foundation of my decision to write this blog entry. Here's why: Flying on a recently failed engine for eight minutes would not give me the confidence in the machine to consider removing the runway as a viable emergency option.

I can only assume that the Fierro landed on Sunrise Highway -- twice -- because the runway (which is not far away) was not an option. Again, a big "well-done" to Frank for the clean landings. However, after only eight minutes in the air, why was the airport not an option? I don't think there is a specific length of time to reference when re-building trust in a machine that tried to kill you the last time you used it, but eight minutes is undoubtedly less than whatever it would be. Therefore, the airfield must be kept as the primary option in the event of a repeat of the engine-out emergency. There are even two viable runways in the immediate vicinity, drastically minimizing the probability that the airfield was not an option due to the runway being in use. In the end, based on the limited information given in the article and my limited aviation knowledge, unnecessary risk was taken and the lives of motorists on the ground and the pilot himself were jeopardized.

What precautions would you have taken in Frank's situation? How liable is Frank in regards to the safety of others on the ground and of himself? How would you feel if, instead of a single pilot in an ultralight aircraft, this was an active crew on board a fully loaded commercial airliner? Is the amount of risk different, and if so, are the number of precautions we take in each situation justified?

AOPA. General Aviation Safety Record - Current and Historic. 2011. Retrieved from http://www.aopa.org/About-AOPA/Gener...t-and-Historic

Niles, R. AVweb. Two Off-Airport Landings in Eight Days. July 20, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/news...s222378-1.html